Alberta's process is deficient

I am submitting these comments as an Indigenous woman, a Section 35 rights‑holder, and a professional with more than twenty years of experience in Crown–Indigenous consultation, regulatory processes, and Indigenous rights impact assessment. My experience spans provincial, federal, and Indigenous‑governed systems, including direct participation in consultation processes under Alberta’s Consultation Policy and Guidelines as well as Canada’s processes through the Impact Assessment Agency and the Canada Energy Regulator.

After reviewing the Draft Co‑operation Agreement between Alberta and Canada, I have significant concerns that the proposed framework fails to uphold the honour of the Crown, does not meet constitutional standards for consultation, and embeds systemic deficiencies present in Alberta’s consultation regime into federal decision‑making. These deficiencies create foreseeable and unacceptable risks to Treaty rights, Métis harvesting rights, Indigenous Knowledge, and the integrity of federal impact assessment.

This submission provides a legal critique of the draft agreement, a comparative analysis with other provincial–federal co‑operation models, and a risk assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Treaty 6, 7, and 8 territories and Métis communities.

I respectfully request that Canada revise the draft agreement to ensure that federal obligations under Section 35, the Impact Assessment Act, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) are upheld, and that Indigenous Peoples are not placed in a weaker position than they are today. The justification for this request is provided in the following analysis.

Clause 1(1): Federal reliance on Alberta’s processes

“Canada will recognize Alberta as best placed to undertake an assessment… and will rely on Alberta’s environmental assessment or regulatory processes…”

Legal concern:
This clause improperly delegates federal constitutional obligations to a provincial process that is not rights‑based, is proponent‑driven, and does not meet federal standards for consultation or cumulative effects assessment. The federal Crown cannot rely on a provincial process that is structurally incapable of addressing adverse effects within federal jurisdiction.

Clause 1(2): Integration of Alberta’s requirements into federal assessments

This clause allows Alberta to shape federal assessments even where federal jurisdiction is clear (e.g., fisheries, species at risk, federal lands).

Legal concern:
This clause risks fettering federal discretion and undermining the independence of federal impact assessment.

Clause 3(1): Avoiding duplicative decision‑making

IAAC commits to relying on Alberta’s processes where Alberta “confirms” it can address adverse effects within federal jurisdiction.

Legal concern:
Alberta’s confirmation is not a legal safeguard. Alberta’s consultation system does not require cumulative effects analysis, Indigenous‑led assessment, or rights‑based evaluation. Federal reliance on Alberta’s assurances is insufficient to meet the honour of the Crown.

Clause 6(1): Federal conditions will defer to provincial conditions

“Where duplication… has been identified, federal conditions will defer to provincial conditions…”

Legal concern:
This clause is incompatible with federal duties under the Impact Assessment Act. Alberta’s conditions rarely include Indigenous‑specific protections, Indigenous monitoring, or Indigenous Knowledge requirements. Deference to weaker provincial conditions exposes Indigenous rights to harm.

Clause 7(1): Delegation of consultation to Alberta

“Canada will recognize Alberta as best placed to consult with Indigenous Peoples pursuant to Alberta’s consultation policies and practices…”

Legal concern:
This is the most problematic clause in the agreement. Alberta’s consultation regime is procedurally narrow, excludes many Métis communities, and treats consultation as a procedural checkbox rather than a rights‑based obligation. Federal delegation to this system is inconsistent with Section 35 jurisprudence and UNDRIP.

Clause 7(3): Indigenous‑led assessment

This clause states that nothing prevents Indigenous‑led assessment, but provides no mechanism, funding, or authority.

Legal concern:
This is symbolic only. Without enforceable mechanisms, Indigenous‑led assessment remains theoretical.

Clause 8: Indigenous Knowledge

Alberta commits only to receiving Indigenous Knowledge “in accordance with Alberta’s legislation, policies, and practices.”

Legal concern:
Alberta’s policies do not provide adequate protection for Indigenous Knowledge, nor do they align with federal standards or UNDRIP.

Clause 10(2): Alberta’s constitutional challenge to the IAA

This clause acknowledges Alberta’s ongoing challenge to the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act.

Legal concern:
Canada is entering into a co‑operation agreement with a party that does not accept the constitutionality of the federal statute governing the agreement. This creates legal instability and undermines predictability for Indigenous Nations.

Comparative Analysis: Alberta agreement vs. BC vs. Ontario agreements

A. British Columbia

BC’s Environmental Assessment Act includes:

• Indigenous‑led assessment pathways
• Consent‑based decision‑making for participating Indigenous Nations
• Statutory recognition of Indigenous Knowledge
• Shared decision‑making mechanisms

Alberta’s draft agreement contains none of these features. It represents a regression from national best practices.

B. Ontario

Ontario’s federal–provincial co‑operation agreements:

• Do not delegate federal consultation to the province
• Maintain federal independence in decision‑making
• Require federal assessment where federal jurisdiction is engaged

Ontario’s model preserves federal obligations. Alberta’s model attempts to offload them.

C. Alberta

Alberta’s consultation system:

• Is proponent‑driven
• Excludes many Métis communities
• Does not require cumulative effects assessment
• Does not incorporate UNDRIP
• Treats consultation as procedural, not substantive
• Does not apply conditions designed to protect Indigenous Rights
• Does not allow for Indigenous monitoring, oversight or guardianship

Conclusion:
The Alberta draft agreement is the weakest of the three models and exposes Indigenous Peoples to the greatest risk.

Risk identification for Treaty 6, 7, 8 First Nations and Métis Communities

A. Treaty Rights

• Loss of federal oversight risks erosion of hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering rights.
• Alberta’s system does not assess cumulative effects on Treaty rights.
• Poses great risk to Canada and Alberta considering the Yehay v. British Columbia and the soon to be heard Beaver Lake v. Canada and Alberta case.

B. Water Security

• Alberta’s regulatory system does not require Indigenous‑led water monitoring.
• Federal deference to Alberta risks inadequate protection of major watersheds.

C. Wildlife and Habitat

• Alberta’s fragmented land‑use planning and weak species‑at‑risk protections create foreseeable impacts on caribou, moose, bear, beaver and other culturally significant species.

D. Métis Rights

• Alberta’s consultation regime excludes many Métis communities and Settlements.
• Delegation to Alberta risks violating Métis harvesting rights.

E. Indigenous Knowledge

• Alberta’s policies do not meet federal standards for protection, confidentiality, or governance of Indigenous Knowledge.
• Alberta has no requirement to include let alone consider Indigenous Knowledge, most environmental impact assessments conducted under Alberta’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act are mute on Indigenous Knowledge.

F. Cumulative Effects

• Alberta does not require cumulative effects assessment. Current mapping exercised conducted by First Nations have indicated that Alberta has less than 9% of intact lands on which Indigenous Rights can be practiced in a safe and healthy manner.
• Federal reliance on Alberta’s processes will result in incomplete assessments of long‑term impacts.

Canada must uphold its Treaty, fiduciary and statutory obligations while upholding the Honour of the Crown, this Agreement does not achieve these obligations. I am hopeful that Canada will revisit this agreement. Consider this Agreement considering Chief Laurie Carr’s, Hiawatha First Nation, open letter to Prime Minister Carney when reviewing this submission.