The Alberta Impact Assessment Process does not match Federal processes

Canada’s environmental assessment system exists to protect the public interest, uphold Indigenous rights, and ensure that major projects do not compromise the health of ecosystems or communities. The draft Co‑operation Agreement Between Alberta and Canada fails to meet that standard. Instead, it proposes a framework in which the federal government systematically defers to a provincial environmental assessment (EA) regime that is narrower, weaker, and structurally incapable of addressing federal responsibilities.

The agreement repeatedly commits Canada to rely on Alberta’s processes “to address adverse effects within federal jurisdiction” for projects primarily under provincial jurisdiction (Clause 1(1)) and to avoid “duplicative decision‑making” by deferring to Alberta where Alberta asserts it can address federal effects (Clause 3(1)).

This is not cooperation. It is abdication.

1. Alberta’s EA Regime Is Not Equivalent to the Federal Impact Assessment Act

1.1 Alberta’s EA is narrow, project‑focused, and structurally outdated

The federal Impact Assessment Act (IAA) requires assessment of environmental, health, social, economic, climate, and Indigenous‑rights impacts. Alberta’s EA regime, by contrast, is built around a biophysical, project‑by‑project model that does not integrate:

• cumulative effects
• climate obligations
• Indigenous rights
• sustainability
• interjurisdictional impacts
• long‑term ecological thresholds

The federal government cannot credibly claim that Alberta’s process is capable of addressing federal‑effects categories when Alberta’s legislation was never designed to do so.

1.2 Alberta’s cumulative‑effects management is demonstrably insufficient

Alberta’s own land‑use framework acknowledges that project‑by‑project assessment “has not worked as well” for cumulative effects. Regional thresholds remain incomplete or unenforced. Watersheds, airsheds, and wildlife ranges across the province are already over‑allocated. Yet the draft agreement proposes that Canada rely on Alberta’s EA to address cumulative effects within federal jurisdiction (Clause 1(1)).

This is a recipe for continued ecological decline. Alberta is already overdeveloped with little intact land remaining for the practice of rights in a clean and healthy environment.

1.3 Alberta rejects UNDRIP as binding, this agreement entrenches that position

The preamble acknowledges that Canada “maintains its commitment to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),” while Alberta “views UNDRIP as non‑binding”. Despite this fundamental divergence, Clause 7(1) states that Canada will “recognize Alberta as best placed to consult with Indigenous Peoples” for provincially regulated projects. This is unacceptable. A province that rejects UNDRIP cannot be the primary vehicle for upholding federal constitutional and international obligations.

1.4 The Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) is not an independent assessment body

The AER simultaneously:

• regulates oil, gas, and coal development
• promotes resource extraction
• collects royalties
• administers environmental assessment

Additionally, the AER is funding by industry! This is a textbook conflict of interest. No credible environmental assessment system in the world embeds assessment within a pro‑development regulator, yet the draft agreement proposes that federal oversight defer to this structure.

1.5 Alberta’s process lacks transparency and meaningful participation

Compared to the federal system, Alberta’s EA offers:

• fewer public participation opportunities
• limited participant funding
• less accessible documentation
• weaker transparency requirements

Communities and Indigenous Nations already struggle to participate meaningfully in Alberta’s EA. The draft agreement would further reduce their access to federal processes that are more transparent and better resourced.

2. How the Draft Agreement Entrenches These Weaknesses

2.1 Clause 1(1): Systematic federal deference to Alberta

Canada commits to relying on Alberta’s processes to address federal effects for provincially regulated projects. This clause effectively allows Alberta to define the adequacy of its own process, a self‑certification model that undermines federal oversight.

2.2 Clause 3(1): Avoiding “duplicative decision‑making”

This clause is framed as efficiency, but in practice it means federal withdrawal.
Duplication is not the problem. Weak provincial processes are the problem.

2.3 Clause 6(1): Federal conditions must defer to provincial conditions

This clause states that where conditions overlap, “federal conditions will defer to provincial conditions and authority” when provincial tools exist. This is an extraordinary concession. It makes the provincial standard the ceiling, not the floor (the Alberta process is indeed the floor), even where federal obligations require stronger protections.

2.4 Clause 7(1): Delegation of Indigenous consultation to Alberta

Canada proposes to rely on Alberta’s consultation processes even though Alberta rejects UNDRIP as binding. This clause would materially weaken the protection of Indigenous rights.

2.5 Clause 5(1): Compressed two‑year timeline

Complex projects with cumulative, interjurisdictional, and rights‑based impacts cannot be meaningfully assessed under rigid timelines, especially when relying on a weaker provincial process.

3. Recommendations

To avoid creating a lowest‑common‑denominator assessment system, the following amendments are essential:

3.1 Remove automatic deference clauses (1(1), 3(1), 6(1), 7(1))

Federal oversight must remain independent, rigorous, and rights‑based.

3.2 Require a formal equivalency analysis before federal reliance

Canada must demonstrate, not assume, that Alberta’s process meets federal standards.

3.3 Protect federal consultation obligations

Canada must retain responsibility for consultation where provincial processes fall short of UNDRIP‑aligned standards. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Canada exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians,” which includes a constitutional responsibility to ensure that consultation with Indigenous Peoples is meaningful, adequate, and consistent with the honour of the Crown. This duty cannot be delegated in a way that undermines its substance. While Alberta may conduct consultation for provincially regulated projects, Canada must independently ensure that the process meets federal constitutional standards. The draft Co‑operation Agreement’s proposal that Canada “recognize Alberta as best placed to consult” (Clause 7(1)) is inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under s.91(24), particularly given Alberta’s explicit position that UNDRIP is non‑binding. Canada cannot rely on a provincial process that does not share its constitutional commitments.

3.4 Strengthen cumulative‑effects safeguards

Federal assessment must be mandatory in regions with known cumulative stress. Alberta is currently over developed, remediation, reclamation and restoration are not priorities; these activities must keep pace with developments.

3.5 Ensure transparency and independence

Federal reliance should be contingent on minimum standards for transparency, participation, and institutional independence.

Conclusion

The draft Co‑operation Agreement does not strengthen environmental assessment in Canada. It weakens it. It proposes a system in which federal responsibilities are delegated to a provincial regime that lacks the scope, independence, transparency, and rights‑based foundation required to protect the public interest.

Canada must not allow efficiency to become a pretext for lowering standards.
“One project, one review” must mean one robust review, not one that defaults to the weakest available process.

I urge the Agency to revise the agreement to ensure that federal responsibilities are upheld, Indigenous rights are protected, and environmental integrity is not compromised.